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Summary prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (b) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 and paragraph 5 of the annex to Council resolution 16/21

Democratic People's Republic of Korea*

The present report is a summary of 12 stakeholders' submissions[1] to the universal periodic review. It follows the general guidelines adopted by the Human Rights Council in its decision 17/119. It does not contain any opinions, views or suggestions on the part of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), nor any judgement or determination in relation to specific claims. The information included herein has been systematically referenced in endnotes and, to the extent possible, the original texts have not been altered. As provided for in Resolution 16/21 of the Human Rights Council, where appropriate, a separate section is provided for contributions by the national human rights institution of the State under review that is accredited in full compliance with the Paris Principles. The full texts of all submissions received are available on the OHCHR website. The report has been prepared taking into consideration the periodicity of the review and developments during that period.

* The present document was not edited before being sent to United Nations translation services.

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Information provided by other stakeholders

A. Background and framework

1. Scope of international obligations

1. No Fence Association for the Abolition of Concentration Camps in North Korea (NoFence) noted the recent signature of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities[2] and Joint Submission 1 (JS1) recommended its ratification.[3] Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR) stated that the Government should sign and ratify the CPED and recognize the competence of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances.[4] JS1 recommended the signing and ratification of the Convention against Torture (CAT) to eliminate all forms of torture carried out by the security agency and prison personnel.[5]

2. Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) recommended ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)[6] with Human Rights Watch (HRW) further recommending the alignment of national legislation to cooperate promptly and fully with the ICC.[7]

3. HRW recommended that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) join the International Labour Organization (ILO), accede to its core conventions, and engage ILO officials on protection and promotion of workers' rights, including ending forced labour in all forms.[8]

2. Constitutional and legislative framework

4. JS1 stated that steps had been taken to implement some human rights regulations, such as the Law on Labour Protection of 2010.[9] NKHR also pointed to the enactment of the Women's Rights Act in December 2010 along with the Children's Rights Act.[10]

5. According to Lawyers for Human Rights and Unification of Korea (LHUK), DPRK in its first national Universal Periodic Review (UPR) report declared that the death penalty could be imposed for only 5 extremely serious crimes provided in Criminal Code revised in 2004 and did not mention the 2007 and 2009 supplementary provisions extending capital offences.[11] International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) stated that on 19 December 2007, an "addendum to the Criminal Code for ordinary crimes" was adopted, which expanded the "crimes" for which the death penalty was applied. It comprised a total of 23 articles, of which 16 stipulated the death penalty for a number of crimes, including smuggling and dealing in narcotics, seizing State property, currency counterfeiting and illicitly selling State resources. The addendum permitted the application of capital punishment as long as the authorities were able to establish that the crime in question was "extremely serious".[12] Amnesty International (AI) also reported that DPRK had expanded the number of crimes punishable by death including extending this punishment in amendments to the Criminal Code in April 2009 to the crime of treacherous (disloyal) destruction.[13]

6. FIDH noted that the scope of crimes punishable by the death penalty further increased following the announcement in 2012 of two public decrees called "circulation of forex punishable by execution" (by the Department of People's Security) and "execution by gun squad for divulging classified information via cell phone" (by the State Security Department).[14] As a result, the total number of crimes carrying the death penalty was 24. Of those, at least 9 had a mandatory death sentence requirement, including crimes like kidnapping, theft, damaging or destruction of state or military property, currency

counterfeiting, smuggling and introducing narcotics or jewels and coloured metals into the black market. Such legislation violated human rights standards.[15]

7. People for Successful COrean REunification (PSCORE) recommended DPRK's full compliance with obligations pertaining to ratified international human rights treaties, thus reassessing national statutes and laws concerning the interpretation of human rights.[16]

3. Institutional and human rights infrastructure and policy measures

8. AI reported that DPRK had no national human rights institution or other independent, effective complaints mechanisms with a human rights mandate.[17]

B. Cooperation with human rights mechanisms

9. With respect to the UPR, Life Funds for North Korean Refugees (LFNKR), while welcoming the participation of the government in the UPR process, urged it to take the review seriously and respond to all recommendations, either accepting them or giving reasons for rejecting them.[18]

10. HRW stated that the DPRK's record of cooperation with UN human rights mechanisms was arguably among the worst. The DPRK refused to recognize UN resolutions on the human rights situation in the DPRK adopted by the UN's Human Rights Council and General Assembly.[19] LFNKR strongly urged the Government to cooperate with and to seek to take its place as a fully productive member of the international community.[20]

11. AI further reported that the human rights situation in the DPRK continued to be shrouded in secrecy. The Government continued to deny access to independent human rights monitors.[21] PSCORE noted that as it was incredibly difficult for human rights defenders to gain access to the DPRK, the main source of information and evidence demonstrating human rights abuses came from defectors.[22]

12. AI pointed out that most recently the Government had refused to allow access to members of the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) into human rights violations in the DPRK, including possible crimes against humanity, established by the UN Human Rights Council in March 2013.[23] HRW recommended that the DPRK recognize the mandate of the COI and issue an invitation for the commission to visit the country.[24]

1. Cooperation with treaty bodies

13. NoFence provided information that the DPRK's National UPR Report failed to indicate that it was a party to the ICCPR.[25] CSW recommended that the DPRK seek to implement all of the recommendations given to it by the various international human rights treaty bodies.[26]

2. Cooperation with special procedures

14. HRW stated that the DPRK rejected the appointment a UN special rapporteur on human rights in the DPRK. Since the establishment of the mandate, neither special rapporteur had been permitted to visit the country.[27] AI recommended the granting of immediate and unrestricted access to all UN Special Procedures who request a visit to DPRK.[28]

C. Implementation of international human rights obligations, taking into account applicable international humanitarian law

1. Equality and non-discrimination

15. CSW stated that a key aspect of control of society was the *songbun* system of social classification, which divided the population into 51 categories of political class, grouped into three broad castes: 'core', 'wavering' and 'hostile' classes. A person's class was determined by birth, taking into consideration the political record and background of the family, and affected every aspect of life, including access to education, health care, food rations and employment opportunities.[29]

16. In its analysis of the Women's Rights Act, NKHR stated that the Act was so vague as to make implementation unlikely. Articles were expressed as general principles. Where plans were mandated, there was no guidance as to what they should contain. There were no timelines for implementation. There was little if any discussion of possible sanctions or other consequences for non-compliance. Secondly, there were a number of quite significant omissions from the Act. The most significant were the lack of attention to gender stereotyping in society or sexual harassment, and the lack of a definitions section. Thirdly, the Act in most respects focused on providing formal rather than substantive equality. Fourth, the monitoring and implementation apparatus was weak.[30]

17. NKHR further reported that many of the policies of the State ran contrary to the idea of rights and freedoms expressed in the Act itself. For example, women reported that the State (through the Women's League) was re-enforcing the ideological education of the traditional role of women in a patriarchal society and educated them on bearing more children, though the State did not provide services for the well-being, education or health of children and the free services system had collapsed long ago.[31]

18. According to NKHR, the fact that the Act provided for equality of women with men in access to labour, wages, social safety, medical care or education was meaningless in practice. More than half of the women had to quit their official jobs to provide for their family. As unemployed officially, they were restricted from using childcare services attached to workplaces or farms. Similarly, education or health services were available only to people who could pay the required fees.[32]

19. HRW[33] and Jubilee Campaign (JC)[34] stated that children faced discrimination and even punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of their parents or other family members. LFNKR called on the government to immediately abolish the class system and the system of "guilt-by-association".[35]

2. Right to life, liberty and security of the person

20. CSW expressed its belief that there was a *prima facie* case of crimes against humanity committed by the DPRK. The strict hierarchical nature of the regime in the DPRK, and information available about decision-making in the government, suggested that the senior political leadership, had responsibility for perpetrating such crimes.[36] Related concerns were raised by JS1.[37]

21. FIDH[38] reported that since DPRK's first UPR, dozens of people had been executed. The judiciary was regularly bypassed and executions frequently occurred in an arbitrary manner, including inside the DPRK's vast prison camp system.[39] Public[40] and secret[41] executions were carried out and the death penalty was applied to non-serious crimes and against vulnerable groups. LHUK also drew attention to the DPRK's comments that it carried out public executions, where a criminal committed brutal crimes and the victim or

his/her family requested to confirm the execution.[42] AI referred to the apparent increased numbers of extra-judicial executions by border guards to prevent people leaving DPRK.[43]

22. FIDH concluded that the DPRK should: immediately put an end to all executions, both inside and outside the prison camp system, and including public and secret executions; establish an immediate moratorium on the death penalty as a first step towards abolition, and take steps to reduce the scope of this penalty to the most serious crimes only, as defined under international human rights law; suppress its mandatory character; publish detailed statistics on death sentences and executions, by gender and by crime; and revise the law so as to erase criminal offenses that are essentially political or too broadly defined as per international human rights standards.[44]

23. CSW stated that the most egregious violations of human rights were perpetrated in the country's prison camps/(kwan-li-so), where torture was extreme, widespread and systematic.[45] AI highlighted that, although conditions varied from one facility to another, all detainees in *kwan-li-so* and other detention facilities were subjected to torture and other forms of ill-treatment.[46] PSCORE reported on starvation allegedly used as a means of torture against prisoners and of control.[47] CSW reported that torture was regularly used in interrogation facilities, sometimes to the point of disability, paralysis or death. Prisoners had also allegedly been used for medical, chemical and biological experiments.[48] LFNKR urged the Government to allow the ICRC to have immediate, full and genuine access to all detention facilities in the DPRK.[49] JS1 recommended compliance with the Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners.[50]

24. AI reported that it released satellite imagery showing four political prison camps *kwan-li-so* occupying huge areas of land and located in vast wilderness sites. Hundreds of thousands of people were estimated to be held in *kwan-li-so* and other detention facilities in DPRK.[51] CSW reported that prisoners in *kwan-li-so* were forced to complete work such as mining, logging and intensive factory labour on the barest of food rations, leaving them prone to fatigue and sickness, and in many cases, to eventual death.[52] JS1 alleged that among those prisoners were persons charged of guilt by association for collective punishment (Yeon-jaw-je) of up to three generations, including children, women, and elders.[53] JS1 recommended abolition of collective punishment, particularly for family members of defectors.[54]

25. NoFence provided details of the exact locations of up to six alleged political prison camps.[55] Alleged modifications of the political prison camps were reported by NoFence,[56] with JS1 stating that a few modifications of the political prison camps had taken place due to the international awareness of its usage by the North Korean regime. While Camp 25 had been dismantled, its 30,000 to 50,000 prisoners had been distributed to other facilities such as Camp 15, Camp 16, and Camp 14.[57] AI also reported that the activity observed in the satellite images pointed to a tightening in the control of movement of the local population adjacent to *kwan-li-so* 14, thus blurring the distinction between those detained in the camp and the valley's inhabitants.[58] JS1 stated that the Government continued to deny the existence of political prison camps,[59] and recommended giving access to international institutions, to guarantee their non-existence and/or closure.[60]

26. JS1 provided details of other different types of detention facilities, including where forced labour was in operation, such as in *Gyo-yang-so*/"labour reform centres", estimated to number more than 200, where everyone was forced to do hard labour such as farming and construction work and where some camps were allegedly operated independently by large-scale business operations, and "labour training centres" where forms of labour were most intensified.[61] HRW also reported on the network of *jip-kyul-so*/(collection center) and *ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae*/(labour training centers) camps that required forced labour from people being held for a variety of so-called crimes, including absence from scheduled work or training, travel without permission, overstaying a travel permission and other crimes.[62]

HRW recommended their immediate closure.[63] JS1 recommended abolition of the re-education through labour system, application of minimum labour standards, national law and Labour Protection rule in detention facilities.[64]

27. PSCORE reported that sexual abuse against women was widespread and tolerated in detention facilities[65] with LFNKR also reporting that torture and rape were commonly used by the security forces.[66] CSW reported that pregnancies were generally disallowed within the prisons and recommended that DPRK must immediately desist from any policy that encourages forced abortions or the murder of newborn babies.[67] JS1 recommended that DPRK apply a standard of action in detention facilities that ensures the Laws that Protect Children and Women's Rights.[68]

28. According to LFNKR, resolution of the issue of forced abductions of foreign nationals had seen no progress since the last UPR.[69] NKHR referred to estimates that by 2011, about 517 abductees from Republic of Korea remained in DPRK and made recommendations.[70] LFNKR urged the DPRK, as a matter of priority, to identify and release all abductees of all nationalities who remain in DPRK.[71]

29. NKHR reported that men and women had confirmed that beatings of women were so inherent in the culture that it was considered normal. Women reported that there still was no place to seek help in case of physical abuse. The police would not intervene as it was seen as a domestic issue.[72] NKHR strongly recommended the drafting of a separate law regarding violence against women.[73]

30. Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children (GIEACPC) reported that corporal punishment of children in all settings had still not been prohibited: it remained lawful in the home, alternative care settings and possibly in schools.[74] GIEACPC recommended that legislation be enacted to explicitly prohibit corporal punishment of children in all settings, including the home.[75]

31. According to HRW, the trafficking of North Korean women and girls persisted. Victims were persuaded to travel to the border either to escape DPRK or to seek economic opportunities and then were abducted or duped into marriage, forced labour or sexual exploitation.[76] JC recommended that all migrant and trafficked people who return to the DPRK, especially children, should be treated as victims and not as criminals.[77]

3. Administration of justice, including impunity and the rule of law

32. JS1 reported that there was a lack of rule of law and judiciary system that would ensure suspects received a fair trial.[78] FIDH reported that, in addition to the opaque nature of the ordinary courts, there was a parallel quasi-penal regime which did not comply with rule of law. The "Ten Principles" guiding the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) were often above the judicial system. The KWP was reportedly informed in advance of trials, and might pronounce sentence alternatives before an actual trial took place. The party not only determined whether or not to detain a suspect, but also systematically influenced the trial process.[79]

33. FIDH reported that investigation and preliminary examinations for ordinary crimes fell under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of People's Security. However, treason, any anti-State crime and political prisoners fell under the jurisdiction of the State Security Department (SSD). Citizens forcibly repatriated from a neighbouring country were allegedly treated as political prisoners and underwent interrogation by the SSD for "treason against the fatherland". In such cases, there was allegedly no formal trial.[80]

34. LFNKR called on the Government to immediately reform its legal system to separate the legislative and executive branches.[81] FIDH recommended that DPRK guarantee the independence of the judiciary and the right to a fair trial as per international human

rights standards.[82] PSCORE recommended the enhancement of due process within the Criminal Procedure of the DPRK and discouragement of courts from accepting forced confessions, which are induced by torture and coercion, as evidence.[83]

35. While, JC noted that according to article 69 of the Constitution, "Citizens are entitled to submit complaints and petitions. The state shall fairly investigate and deal with complaints and petitions as fixed by law,"[84] LFNKR pointed out that criticism of the leadership, overt or not, was punished severely; relatives of those accused of criticising the government were also subjected to increased surveillance and harsh punishment.[85]

4. Right to privacy, marriage and family life

36. According to FIDH, while investigators and police remained the principal agents for the detection of violators of laws, there was also a substantial culture of citizen informants, meaning that every citizen had the duty to report to the political hierarchy, especially if having responsibilities in the *ban*. Any suspicion of wrong doing must be reported immediately, even by family members, who would otherwise suffer the same punishment.[86]

5. Freedom of movement

37. HRW reported that movement within the country without appropriate government-issued permits was a criminal offence. Permits were required to leave one's home area and move internally within DPRK or to leave the country.[87] LFNKR reported that permission to live in the comparatively well-off capital, Pyongyang, was restricted to certain members of the most favoured class.[88]

38. HRW reported on the reasons for persons fleeing the country, including escaping persecution, fearing surveillance and re-arrest after release from forced labour camps, avoiding economic deprivation and food shortages, or seeking to reunite with relatives who had already fled the country. Other North Koreans travelled back and forth between DPRK and a neighbouring country, conducting licit and illicit cross-border trade with the connivance of corrupt DPRK officials yet also fell afoul of the authorities.[89]

39. HRW recommended that all North Korean citizens be allowed to travel freely within the country and called for the release from detention of all persons who are being held for exercising their right to freedom of movement.[90] LFNKR called on the government to allow its citizens to move freely both within the country and beyond its borders, including by providing passports, and to immediately stop the use of torture and rape by its officials.[91]

40. AI stated that since coming to power at the end of 2011, Kim Jong-Un's administration had announced a crackdown on people caught trying to cross the border without permission.[92] JC, HRW and LHUK also reported that the DPRK border patrol had a "shoot-on-sight" order for refugees trying to cross the border illegally.[93] Additionally, AI reported that people returning to DPRK had appeared in propaganda messages, including in interviews broadcast by North Korean TV, to deter others from attempting to leave DPRK.[94] JS1 indicated that the number of defectors coming to the Republic of Korea had decreased by more than 50 percent, reflecting stricter security measures and violence used to deter North Koreans from leaving.[95]

41. AI recommended that DPRK ensure that no one is detained or prosecuted for leaving the country without permission or subjected to torture and other ill-treatment, forced labour, enforced disappearance or the death penalty on return to DPRK.[96]

6. Freedom of religion or belief, expression, association and peaceful assembly, and right to participate in public and political life

42. CSW stated that there was no freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief in the DPRK, and religious believers faced severe persecution. The veneration of the Kim dynasty and the religious nature of their personality cult had allegedly led to intolerance of religious belief. There were at least four state-sanctioned churches in Pyongyang, and a new Protestant seminary, but it was widely believed that they existed primarily for the benefit of foreigners and to present a false image of the situation.[97] JC stated that ownership of bibles or other religious materials was reportedly illegal and might be punished by imprisonment and execution.[98]

43. LFNKR reported that media and other potential sources of information coming into the country were severely restricted by the government.[99] PSCORE highlighted that owning foreign CDs or DVDs was a crime punishable by death.[100] JS1 stated that there were cases where overseas labour workers sent by the Government who had access to external media of the country they worked in were sent to political prison camps.[101] HRW reported that someone seen using a mobile phone could be enough to spark an investigation, arrest, and abuse in detention.[102]

44. LFNKR stated that the leadership was approved by a Parliament, the members of which were chosen by the Workers' Party. The lack of freedom to assemble in public and the existence of only Party-controlled media made it impossible for citizens to express dissenting opinions. As a result there was allegedly no meaningful "public life" or "political life". LFNKR called on the Government to grant its citizens freedoms of religion and assembly, to cease the practise of punishing citizens who criticize the government, and to protect freedom of expression, and to establish free and fair multi-party elections.[103]

7. Right to work and to just and favourable conditions of work

45. HRW reported that the government required forced, uncompensated labour from workers, including even schoolchildren and university students, as part of its economy. Defectors reported that they were required to work at an assigned workplace after completing school, and that many of these jobs were either unpaid or provided minimal substitute compensation in the form of food or other rations. Failure to report to an assigned job for those who tried to earn money in other ways could result in being sent to a forced labour camp for as long as two years.[104] Similar concerns were reported by LFNKR.[105] HRW recommended that workers be permitted to select where they wish to work and to change employment without penalty or punishment.[106]

46. HRW alleged that lack of pay for work meant economic survival for workers and their families often depended on their ability to do their own informal business. For this, bribes must be paid to local officials and to the enterprise manager to release a person from his or her daily work requirement for time to start their own business, such as home production, informal selling of goods at local markets, or itinerant trading between provinces or even across the border.[107]

8. Right to social security and to an adequate standard of living

47. CSW stated that severe poverty and food shortages provided the context for much of the suffering of the people and many abuses perpetrated against them,[108] with LFNKR reporting that North Koreans lacked freedom of movement which left them vulnerable to punishment for travelling without authorization in search of food.[109]

48. HRW reported that the 2004 criminal code contained a chapter on "Offenses against the Management of the Economy" that criminalized a swathe of economic activities, including "illegally giving money or goods in exchange for labour" (article 119). Those

restrictions, when combined with other parts of the law that criminalized violations of trade and imposed foreign exchange controls, allowed the Government to prosecute people for conducting almost any private economic activity.[110]

49. HRW stated that while private economic activities were carried out openly in many parts of the country, farmers and traders risked arbitrary arrests and crackdowns, opening them to abuse, extortion, and imprisonment.[111] HRW recommended that DPRK revoke legislation criminalizing commercial exchanges, trading and market activities, and release all those held in detention for those crimes.[112] LFNKR urged the Government to encourage the development of private enterprise.[113]

50. AI reported that DPRK's grain output had increased and the cereal deficit for 2012/13 was estimated at 507,000 metric tons, the narrowest gap in many years. However, approximately 16 million North Koreans (66 percent of the population) depended on the inadequately resourced Public Distribution System (PDS) and remained chronically food insecure and highly vulnerable to production gaps. Around 2.4 million needed regular food assistance and these included vulnerable groups such as children, pregnant women and the elderly in the most food insecure provinces. The persistent food shortages had worsened the inequality of access to food among North Koreans. The grain distribution by the PDS reportedly favoured specific groups, such as officials of the Workers' Party, State Security Agency, military and military industry, and miners.[114]

51. AI stated that food shortages persisted in part due to failed governmental policies. AI referred to reports that there were starvation deaths in DPRK after the 2009 currency reform and more recently, deaths due to starvation were reported in Hwanghae province.[115] JC made recommendations, including that the DPRK assist the most vulnerable giving them priority food aid.[116]

52. Regarding international food aid distribution, AI reported that access to DPRK had improved, after the April 2011 Letter of Understanding between the Government and the UN World Food Programme, although UN agencies received funding for only a third of their estimates by August 2013.[117] LFNKR urged the Government to commit to working with the international community, seeking any necessary outside expertise, to rebuild its agricultural and food-distribution systems.[118]

9. Right to health

53. According to AI, the Government's delayed and inadequate response to years of chronic food shortages, including reluctance to seek international cooperation and assistance, had led to widespread and chronic malnutrition which in turn had suppressed the immune system of many. Compounded by failed and counter-productive government policies, including the systematic failure to provide resources for basic health care, this had triggered epidemics and mass outbreaks of illnesses related to poor diet.[119]

54. AI stated that although DPRK professed to have universal and free health care, in reality, healthcare facilities were rundown and operated with frequent power cuts and no heating. Medical personnel often did not receive salaries, and many hospitals functioned without medicines and other essentials. Doctors had begun charging for their services, although this was illegal, and the poor increasingly could not access full medical care, especially medicines and surgery. Due to a lack of resources, medical staff had little exposure or access to training on new developments or international best practice.[120] NKHR alleged that a patient needed to secure his own food and food for the doctors in charge when staying in the hospital or rely on provisions from family members.[121] AI and LFNKR made recommendations.[122]

55. According to NKHR, abortion in DPRK was said to be illegal. Pregnancies were aborted at homes, without anaesthesia and proper sanitary conditions. Women also reported lack of education on sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS.[123]

56. Another problem, reported by NKHR, was the increasingly widespread use of narcotics, especially with the lack of access to medical services. Opium was still commonly available, and people tended to grow it near homes, because it was considered a herbal medicine. Use of methamphetamine was allegedly growing rapidly.[124]

10. Right to education

57. LFNKR reported that in practice children were frequently unable to attend school because of the desperate shortage of food, in addition to a lack of adequate clothing and supplies for school.[125] LFNKR urged the Government to commit to working with the international community to rebuild its educational system and ensure that all children receive, at minimum, appropriate free and compulsory primary education that is comparable to those of other countries.[126]

58. JC stated that school children were required to do several hours of military training and political indoctrination and recommended that DPRK stop the process of early militarization of children in the school system.[127]

59. HRW alleged that teachers and school administrators forced students to work, including gathering foodstuffs for re-sale from mountainous areas, cutting down trees for use by the schools, collecting valuable raw materials according to a quota and submitting them for recycling as an alleged part of a government campaign, and working in agriculture on state-run farms. Starting during middle-school years, when they were approximately 11 years old, children studied in the morning but were sent for unpaid school-organized work details in the afternoon. In poorer provinces in the north, students were sometimes expected to be working as early as age 8 or 9. HRW recommended that DPRK immediately cease all use of students of any age for forced, unsafe, or vocationally unjustifiable labour activities.[128]

11. Persons with disabilities

60. NKHR reported that there were traditional social norms that allowed for the discrimination against the disabled. Also, a former official of the Ministry of Public Safety (police) alleged that there was an island with "Hospital 83" to which disabled persons were being sent for medical tests, as well as tests of biological and chemical weapons. The interviewee reported of a long-term labour re-education camp, *Kyo-hwa-so* No. 1 in Kaechon where disabled were often sent to.[129] NKHR recommended that authorities address the reports on the treatment of persons with disabilities and the negative cultural discrimination towards persons with disabilities through education programmes.[130]

12. Minorities

61. LFNKR stated that North Korean society was largely homogeneous. However, women who crossed the border and were found to be pregnant upon their return were commonly forced to undergo abortions in order to prevent the births of half-Chinese children.[131] Related concerns were raised by PSCORE[132] and JS1.[133]

13. Migrants, refugees and asylum seekers

62. HRW stated that leaving the country without state permission was considered an act of treason, punishable by lengthy prison terms. Those captured crossing the border or forcibly returned to DPRK faced interrogation under torture and imprisonment in forced labour camps. Any indication that a North Korean citizen had contact with South Korean

citizens or organizations could result in severe punishments, including imprisonment in *kwan-li-so* and *kyo-hwa-so* camps, or even the death penalty. Even some children who had crossed the border without permission had been subjected to detention and severe ill-treatment upon return. The resulting well-founded fear of persecution upon return turned many North Koreans in a neighbouring country and elsewhere into refugees *sur place*.[134]

14. Right to development

63. LFNKR questioned the apparent prioritising of DPRK's costly nuclear ambitions at the expense of the basics needed for the survival of its people.[135] LFNKR urged the Government to commit to taking a cooperative and productive place in international society that will make unnecessary the diversion of precious resources to excessive military development.[136]

Notes

[1] The stakeholders listed below have contributed information for this summary; the full texts of all original submissions are available at: www.ohchr.org.
Civil society
Individual submissions:

AI	Amnesty International, London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK);
CSW	Christian Solidarity Worldwide, New Malden, UK;
FIDH	International Federation for Human Rights, Paris, France;
GIEACPC	Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children, London, UK;
HRW	Human Rights Watch, Geneva Switzerland;
JC	Jubilee Campaign, Fairfax, VA, United States of America;
LFNKR	Life Funds for North Korean Refugees, Tokyo, Japan;
LHUK	Lawyers for Human Rights and Unification of Korea, Seoul, Republic of Korea;
NKHR	Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, Seoul, Republic of Korea;
NoFence	No Fence in North Korea, Association for the Abolition of Concentration Camps in North Korea, Tokyo, Japan;
PSCORE	People for Successful COrean REunification, Seoul, Republic of Korea.

Joint submissions:

JS1	Joint Submission 1: Coalition for Human Rights in North Korean Detention Facilities submitted by: Free the North Korean Gulag (FNKG) and, North Korea Strategy Center (NKSC), Seoul, Republic of Korea.

[2] NoFence, para.4.
[3] JS1, para 24 recommendation, b.
[4] NKHR, p.6. See also, HRW, p.5.
[5] JS1, para. 43 a. See also, PSCORE, recommendations, p.5.
[6] CSW, para. 8.
[7] HRW, p. 5, recommendations.
[8] HRW, p.6, recommendations.
[9] JS1, para. 5.
[10] NKHR, p.1.
[11] LHUK, para. 2, part D.
[12] FIDH, para. 10.
[13] AI, p.2.
[14] FIDH, para. 11.
[15] FIDH, para. 12.
[16] PSCORE, recommendation , p.5.
[17] AI, p.1.
[18] LFNKR, p.6.
[19] HRW, p.1, summary.
[20] LFNKR, p. 7, introductory paragraph.
[21] AI, p.1.
[22] PSCORE, executive summary.
[23] AI, p.1.
[24] HRW, p.5. See also, CSW, recommendations, paras. 12 and 13.
[25] NoFence, para. 8.
[26] CSW, recommendation, para. 7.
[27] HRW, p.1, summary.
[28] AI, recommendation, p.5. See also, CSW, recommendations, paras. 11, 12 and 13 and HRW, p.5.
[29] CSW, para. 15. See also, CSW, para.23.
[30] NKHR, part A.
[31] NKHR, part A.
[32] NKHR, part A.

[33] HRW, p.5.
[34] JC, para. 21.
[35] LFNKR, p. 2.
[36] CSW, para. 5.
[37] JS1, para. 17.
[38] FIDH, Summary.
[39] See also, PSCORE, para. 6.
[40] See also AI, p 2, JS1, paras.36-37, PSCORE, para. 3 and LHUK, para. 3, part C, p.5.
[41] See also, FIDH, para. 14.
[42] LHUK, point 3, part C, p.5.
[43] AI, p.2.
[44] FIDH, recommendations, p. 7.
[45] CSW, para. 16. See also, PSCORE, paras. 5 and 6
[46] AI, p.2. See also PSCORE, para.10.
[47] PSCORE, para. 5. See also, JS1, para. 32.
[48] CSW, para. 32.
[49] LFNKR, p.7.
[50] JS1, para. 35.
[51] AI, p.1.
[52] CSW, para. 25. See also, CSW, para 17 and JS1, paras. 30-34.
[53] JS1, paras. 13-14. See also, AI, p.2.
[54] JS1, para. 18 a.
[55] NoFence, para. 11.
[56] NoFence, paras. 11 and17.
[57] JS1, para. 16.
[58] AI, p.3.
[59] JS1, para. 46.
[60] JS1, para. 18 c. See also, NoFence, recommendations, p.5 and AI recommendations p.4.
[61] JS1, para. 7, parts b and d. See also, PSCORE, para. 9.
[62] HRW, p.4.
[63] HRW, p.6.
[64] JS1, para. 24.
[65] PSCORE, para. 11. See also, recommendation, p.5.
[66] LFNKR, point 3, p. 3.
[67] CSW, paras. 26 and 29.
[68] JS1, recommendation, para. 29 a. See also, JS1, paras. 25-27.
[69] LFNKR, p.3.
[70] NKHR, pp. 4-6.
[71] LFNKR, p.3.
[72] NKHR, p.3.
[73] NKHR, p. 5.
[74] GIEACPC, para. 1.2.
[75] GIEACPC, p.1 and para 1.3.
[76] HRW, p.2.
[77] JC, para. 27. See also, JC, paras. 25, 9, 13-14.
[78] JS1, para. 8.
[79] FIDH, para. 18.
[80] FIDH, para. 20.
[81] LFNKR, p.3.
[82] FIDH, part III, p.7
[83] PSCORE, p.5. See also, JS1, para. 12, and AI, p.4.
[84] JC, para. 2.
[85] LFNKR, pp.3-4.
[86] FIDH, para. 21.
[87] HRW, p.3.
[88] LFNKR, point 1, p. 2. See also, LFNKR, point 2, p.3.

[89] HRW, p.2.
[90] HRW, p.5.
[91] LFNKR, p.5.
[92] AI, p.2.
[93] JC, para. 8, HRW, p. 2 and LHUK, para. 3, part E, p.7.
[94] AI, p. 3.
[95] JS1, para. 7.
[96] AI, p. 4.
[97] CSW, para. 34.
[98] JC, para. 16. See also JC, paras. 15, 18 and 19.
[99] LFNKR, p.2. See also, LFNKR, recommendations, p.7 and HRW, p.3.
[100] PSCORE, para. 2. See also, HRW, pp.3-4.
[101] JS1, para. 11.
[102] HRW, p.4. See also, HRW, recommendations, p.5.
[103] LFNKR, p.4.
[104] HRW, p.4.
[105] LFNKR, point 5, p.4.
[106] HRW, p.6.
[107] HRW, p.4.
[108] CSW, para. 37.
[109] LFNKR, point 6, p.4.
[110] HRW, p.3. See also, LFNKR, p.4.
[111] HRW, p.3.
[112] HRW, p.5.
[113] LFNKR, p.7.
[114] AI, p.2.
[115] AI, pp.2-3.
[116] JC, para. 24 and see also recommendation, para 23.
[117] AI, p.3.
[118] LFNKR, p.7.
[119] AI, p.3.
[120] AI, pp.3-4
[121] NKHR, part B, p.3.
[122] LFNKR, p.7 and AI, p.4.
[123] NKHR, part B, p.3.
[124] NKHR, p.3.
[125] LFNKR, point 7, p.4.
[126] LFNKR, p.7.
[127] JC, paras 20 and 29.
[128] HRW, pp. 4-5 and recommendations, p.7.
[129] NKHR, part B, p.4.
[130] NKHR, p.5.
[131] LFNKR, point 9, p.5. See also LFNKR, p.2.
[132] PSCORE, para. 12.
[133] JS1, para. 26.
[134] HRW, p.2. See also, JC, paras. 9-12.
[135] LFNKR, p.6. See also, executive summary.
[136] LFNKR, p.7.